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The Battle of Tierra Amarilla
NORMAN J. BENDER

In the annals of warfare between Indians and the U.S. Army in the
Southwest, the May 1872 confrontation between
Indians and soldiers of the Eighth Cavalry at the small community of Tierra Amarilla
in northern New Mexico is generally ignored. At first glance this minor
engagement seems to result from unfortunate circumstances unique to
a particular situation. By examining these events in the broader perspective of the spirit of the times, however, they provide a fine example
of problems experienced by well-meaning Indian agents trying to do
good for the Indians entrusted to their care under the so-called Peace
Policy of the 1870s. I

Ute

Norman J. Bender is a Professor of History in the University of Colorado, Colorado
Springs. He re~eived his bachelor's degree from WashingtonUniversity, St. Louis, and
his,Ph.D, from the University of Colorado, He is the author of Missionaries, Outlaws, and
Indians: Taylor F. Ealy at Lincoln and Zuni, 1878-1881 (198;4).
1. Tierra Amarilla ;(meaning yellow earth in Spanish) is a farming and ranching
community located about eighty-five miles northwest of Santa Fe. From its origin as a
townsite filed in 1832, it has grown to become the county seat of Rio Arriba County. See
T. M. Pearce, ed., New Mexico Place Names: A Geographical Dictionary (Albuquerque:.University of New Mexico Press, 1965), 165. For contrasting interpretations of the. Peace
Policy see Henry E. Fritz, The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890 (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963); Robert H. Keller, Jr., American Protestantism and
United States Indian Policy, 1869~1882 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); Robert
Winston Mardock, The Reformers and, the AlJIerican Indian (Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 1971); Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and
the Indian, 1865-1900 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); Henry G. Waltmann, "Circumstantial Reformer: President Grant and the Indian Problem, ".Arizona and
the West, 13 (Winter 1971), 323-42.
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Reacting to demand·for reform of the Indian service after the Civil
War, President Ulysses S. Grant agreed in June 1870 to a plan whereby
all appointees as Indian agents would be Christian men nominated by
the mission boards of the nation's great churches. In subsequent distribution of agencies among churches, the Presbyterian Church received
responsibility in the Southwest for appointments at the Navajo and
Hopi agencies in Arizona, the southern Apache and Mescalero Apache
agencies in southern New Mexico, and the agency for the Jicarilla
Apaches and Moache Utes at Cimarron in northeastern New Mexico.
In spring 1871, when the Lutheran Church decided to relinquish the
agency for the Capote and Weminuche Utes at Abiquiu in north central
New Mexico because "the field of usefulness [was] not very promising,"
the Presbyterians agreed to accept this additional obligation. 2
The noticeable lack of promise for useful service to the Capote and
Weminuche Utes could have been explained by the resistance of these
Indians to plans by their Great Father in Washington, D.C., to move
them from their traditional hunting grounds to join other Utes on a
reservation in southwestern Colorado. A treaty signed in 1868 between
the United States and leaders of various Ute bands, including the
Capote and Weminuche factions, had presumably included a pledge
from the Indians to gather on the proposed reservation established for
their "absolute and undisturbed" use. Months and years passed, however, while the New Mexico Utes chose to deny that they had ever
really agreed to the relocation. 3
2. Jacob D. Cox to John Lowrie, August 19, 1870, document 276, file B-2, letters
received, American Indian Correspondence (AIC), Record Group (RG) Ms In25, Presbyterian Historical SOciety, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; B. R. Cowen to Lowrie, June 27,
1871, document 275, file RG 31-40-8, AIC; E. S. Zevely to Board of Indian Commissioners,
March 15, 1871, letters received, Board of Indian Commissioners, 1870-1872, 5 vols., I:
i45, RG 75, National Archives, Washington, D.C. The northern branch of the Presbyterian Church, known at the time as the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
Ainerica, had responsibility for agencies in the Southwest and for the Uintah Valley
agency for the Ute Indians in Utah, the Seminole and Choctaw agencies in Indian
Territory, and the Nez Perce agency in Idaho.
3. The Capote, Weminuche, and Moache bands were regarded generally as the
Southern Utes. They resided in parts ofsouthern Colorado and northern New Mexico,
while Tabeguache, Grand River, Yainpa, and Uintah Utes considered areas of central
and northern Colorado and eastern Utah their home. See Floyd A. O'Neil, ed., The
Southern Utes: A Tribal History (Ignacio, Colorado: Southern Ute Tribe, 1972); vii-viii;
James W. Covington, "Federal Relations Between Ute Indians and the United States
Government, 1848-1900" (doctoral dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1949); Orner
C.Stewart, Ethnohistorical Bibliography of the Ute Indians of Colorado (Boulder: University
of Colorado Press, 1971); and Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Treaties, 1778-1883 (New
York: Interland Publishing Co., 1972), 990-96.
.
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With little or no awareness ofthe situation, John Lowrie, secretary
of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in New
York City, assigned John,S. Armstrong ofXenia, Ohio, to the Abiquiu
agency. Numerous endorsements for Armstrong seemed to make him
an ideal candidate for the position. Armstrong was a good family man
with a wife and two small children. He had received an excellent collegiate and theological education, intending at one time to become a
minister. He also had served with honor as an officer in the Union
Army. Since the' war he had 'an excellent employment record with the
Pittsburgh, Cihcinnati and St. Louis Railroad. Lowrie. decided to submit
his name to the Office of Indian Affairs for the Abiquiu appointment,
but· when Armstrong learned in July of his assignment he could not
decide, at first, if he really wantedit. 4 ,
Armstrong apparently. had permitted his friends to forward his
name as an applicant for an agency appointment, but having heard
nothing from these recommendations, he was surprised when he read
about his selection in the Xenia. Gazette. Assuming the name Abiquiu
denoted an Indian tribe, he wrote at once to the Office of Indian Affairs
requesting information about them. Armstrong soon received assurance that the Utes at Abiquiu, numbering about one thousand persons,
were among the most peaceable and friendly of any Indians in New
Mexico. In his ne~ job, he would be expected to induce his Indians
to settle in homes, establish schools, cultivate the soil, and, in all
respects, learn the arts of civilized life. After recei~ing this information,
Armstrongsurprisingly announced tha't he must decline the appointment. The very sudden notice, he said, prevented him from making
suitable arrangements for his business and family. 5
.'.
John Lowrie, disappointed by this unexpected turn of events,
searched for another nominee. But before a replacement could be
approved,. Armstrong changed his mind, informing one and all of his
4. J. W. Montgomery to Lowrie, February 3, 1871, and Allison Eavry to Lowrie;'
February 25, 1871, documents 66 and 68, file RG 31-40-6, Ale. See alSo Henry G. Waltmann, "John e. Lowrie and Presbyterian Indian Administration, 1870-1882," Journal of
Presbyterilm History, 54 (Summer 1976), 259-76. In 1837 the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church gave care of American Indian missions to' the Board of Foreign
Missions, reasoning that Indian tribes' were treated as foreign nations and spoke foreign
languages.. See Sherman H. Doyle, Presbyterian Home Missions (Philadelphia: Presbyterian
Board of Publications and Sabbath School Work, 1902), 74.'
5. John S. Armstrong to Ely S. Parker; July 19, 1871, letters received, 1824-1880,
New Mexico Superintendency, microcopy M-234, roll 558, Office of Indian Affairs (OIA),
RG 75, National Archives, Washington, D.e.;H. R. Clum to Armstrong, July 27, 1871,
letters sent, 1824-1882, MiCrocopy M-21, roll 102,' ibid.; Armstrong to Clum, July 31,
1871, document 233, file L-1, Ale.
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renewed willingness to go to Abiquiu. The Secretary of the Interior
then announced Armstrong's appointment effective August 23, 1871.
A week later Lowrie was dismayed when he received still another
rejection notice from Armstrong who maintained, again, that he could
not arrange his affairs in Xenia in time to allow for an early departure
to New Mexico. Lowrie and numerous other government officials surely
were ready to write finis to Armstrong, but to their amazement, the
vacillating nominee announced a few days later that he had changed
his mind yet again. With a travel advance of three hundred dollars
from the Office of Indian Affairs already in his possession, Armstrong
said he was ready to start for New Mexico in early September. Finally,
on October 3, 1871, a Santa Fe newspaper revealed Armstrong's departure from that city to assume his duties as Indian agent at Abiquiu. 6
When Armstrong arrived at Abiquiu he relieved Lieutenant Jonathan B. Hanson, who had been detached from regular duty with the
Twenty-fifth Infantry in August 1869 to fill the agency position at Abiquiu temporarily.7 Hanson's experience with the Utes had not been
gratifying. The Indians firmly opposed arrangements in the 1868 treaty
for relocation in Colorado. Although annuity goods promised in the
treaty were deliberately withheld from the Utes to try to coerce them
into making the move, Hanson saw no reason not to provide emergency
assistance to his Indians. At times he obtained limited supplies of food
from an incidental fund maintained by the Superintendent of Indian
Affairs for New Mexico in Santa Fe. No money was available, however,
to secure badly needed clothing for the practically naked Utes who
came to the agency in winter suffering from exposure. Complaining
bitterly about his lack of support, Hanson told his superiors that under
the circumstances "it becomes very disagreeable for the agent, and also
very difficult to 'keep the Indians contented and peaceable."s
.
John Armstrong received his initial exposure to conditions at the
agency when he viewed his headquarters for the first time. One small
building served as storehouse and residence for the agent and was
6. Armstrong to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 18, 1871, Armstrong to
Clum, September 5, 1871, M-234, roll 558, OIA, RG 75; Clum to Nathaniel Pope,August
23, 1871, Records of the New Mexico Superintendency of Indian Affairs, 1849-1880,
microcopy T-21, rolll3, alA, RG 75; Santa Fe Daily New. Mexican, October 3, 1871.
7. Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (2
vols., Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903), I: 498.
8. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary o/the Interior, 1871 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1871), 368, 404-9; Jonathan B. Hanson to
Pope, April 5, 1871, T-21, roll 13, alA, RG 75.
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rented from a local citizen for a two-hundred-dollar annual fee, an
amount more than half its original cost. The new agent's dejection
increased as he explored the Abiquiu countryside. Recalling his directive to make the Indians tillers of the soil, he recognized at once the
futility of this edict. He could find no available land in Abiquiu or its
vicinity suitable for cultivation. 'Despite such disquieting discoveries,
Armstrong determined to learn more of these Indians. But even this
commendable goal proved difficult to achieve because only on rare
occasions did small groups of Utes appear at the agency. During those
visits Armstrong could, not help noticing with despair the destitute
condition of his charges who, in his opinion, seemed to know nothing
of civilized life. In fact as Armstrong knew it, civllized life in Abiquiu
was very hard to discern at all. Moreover, since his family had remained
in Xenia, he was lonely. He was a newcomer in a small town and felt
excluded by his neighbors, all of whom spoke Spanish and belonged
to the Catholic Church. Although he would have welcomed the company of a missionary of his own faith, he admitted to John Lowrie that
assigning a Presbyterian m~nister to Abiquiu would probably be unwise
in light of Catholicism's entrenched position. 9
Armstrong also was troubled by the severity of winter in northern
New Mexico. An attack of inflammatory rheumatism, which he attributed to the cold and heavY snow, became so severe that he had to
travel to Santa Fe early- irlJebruary for medical treatment. Recovered
somewhat-'from his 'prostrating iUness, Armstrong returned in a few
days to Abiquiu where he found an inquiry from John Lowrie awaiting
him. The'missionboard secretary wondered if A~mstrong thought his
Indians could be clvilized and Christianized. Armstrong's response was
not encouraging. He regarded the Capote and Weminuche Utes as
existing in "a state of nature," roaming at large with no desire to settle
down and become tillers of the soil .. They appe'ared content with a life
style sustained by hunting and occasional government handouts. Their
salvation, materially and spiritually, depended of course on their acquiescence to reservation life where, in Armstrong's estimation, at least
two hundred children and adults would want to attend school. With
his Indians on a reservation, Armstrong believed he could shield them
from the Catholic priests who, Armstrong believed, were attempting
9. Hanson to Parker, February 10, 1871, M-234, roll 558, OlA, RG 75; Armstrong to
Pope, November 4, 1871, T-21, roll 13, ibid.; Armstrong to Lowrie, November 20, 187!,
document 233, file RG 3-40-8, ibid.
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John Cameron Lowrie, secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in New York City, had his hands full with John Armstrong
as head of the Ute agency at Abiquiu during the Battle of Tierra Amarilla.
Courtesy of Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
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to bring whole tribes into their church. Finally, confinement on a reservation would help Armstrong attain one ofhis primary goals: prevent
Indians from obtaining intoxicating liquors from white men. to
The hazards of Indians securing alcoholic beverages from unscrupulous white traders were vividly illustrated at Abiquiu near the end
of February when fifty Utes visited the town to obtain supplies. Twenty
members .of the group remained overnight and managed to obtain
liquor from local dealers. When the Indians became intoxicated, they
began threatening agency employees and villagers. Only the determined efforts of an agency interpreter and other citizens succeeded in
confining the Utes until they sobered, presumably preventing an outbreak of violence in the streets of Abiquiu. Although the Indians refused
to reveal who had given them the liquor, Armstrong immediatelybrought
suspeCts before a Santa Fe grand jury for indictment and trial. Following that, Armstronginsi~tednothing more was seen of drunken Indians
and anticipated no more trouble. It
.
Unfortunatley, not only
Indians found it difficult to resist liquor
in Abiquiu. David McFarland, pastor of the Presbyterian Church in
Santa Fe, felt it his duty to notify Nathaniel Pope, Superintendent of
Indian Affairs for New Mexico, that Armstrong was said to have been
unmistakenly intoxicated on many occasions. Learning of McFarland's
allegations, Armstrong endeavored to explain his conduct. While in
the army, he told McFarland, he had suffered from rheumatism,'and
a physician had prescribed 'certain drugs and liquors for his relief. At
Abiquiu his ailment persisted, and Armstrong confessed that he may
have used too much medication at times, but only because· he desperately needed to alleviate his pain. t2
Rumors of Armstrong's affliction reached other New Mexico Presbyterians as well. John Lowrie finally heard of the situation from Andrew
Curtis, Presbyterian agent for the Mescalero Apaches at Fort Stanton.
Curtis heard of Armstrong becoming so inebriated on one visit to Santa
Fe that he lost his hat. Fearing reports of his condition had reached
the mission board, Armstrong tried to defend himself. He told Lowrie
his rheumatism had flared up again because of having to camp in
inclement weather when visiting Indians. He insisted his treatment

Ute

10. Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, February 3, 1872; Armstrong to Lowrie, March 2
and March 5, 1872, documents 74 and 77, file L-1, AIC.
11. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, 1872
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1872),307-8; Armstrong to Pope, February 29, 1872, T-21, roll 15, OIA, RG 75.
12. McFarland to Pope, March 5, 1872, Armstrong to McFarland, April 4, 1872, T21, rolls 17 and 15, ibid.
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with morphine, combined with wine and other liquors, had been prescribed by a reputable physician in Santa Fe. Fortunately, because of
complete recovery, he could discontinue his "medicine." Lowrie generously accepted Armstrong's explanation but noted the board's deep
concern over his conduct. 13
Armstrong needed better health when warmer weather returned
to New Mexico because his Indians had resumed their wandering life
style. One particular band of Capote Utes, led by Sobota, precipitated
a crisis at the end of March. Earlier in the month the Utes had heard
the Great Spirit was visiting his people in the Green River valley of
Utah. Convinced that if he took his followers there they would receive
everything they would need for health and happiness, Sobota determined to go see this wonder.. The Utes allegedly stole about thirty
horses to help convey them to the hallowed meeting place. Learning
of the Indians' departure, Armstrong sent a messenger to order them
to return and surrender the stolen animals. When the messenger overtook Sobota's band, the Utes refused to obey, arrogantly maintaining
they had only borrowed the horses and would relinquish them when
they returned to Abiquiu. Dismayed by this report and stories of other
Ute depredations, Armstrong called on the cavalry on April 3 to help
keep peace and chastise the rebellious Utes. 14 Together, these events
set the stage for the battle of Tierra Amarilla on May 6, 1872.
Responding at the end of April to Armstrong's distress signals, a
detachment of troops from the Eighth Cavalry stationed at Fort Wingate, New Mexico, arrived at Tierra Amarilla where a meeting was
scheduled for May 6 between Armstrong, Lieutenant J. ·D. Stevenson,
commander of the soldiers, and Sobota and his Utes. The conference
began at 9 A.M. in a large room secured for the purpose. It adjoined
the town plaza. Stevenson began the discussion notifying the Indians
of the anger of government officials in New Mexico at the "perfidious
conduct" the Utes exhibited when they violated pledges made in their

13. Andrew Curtis to Lowrie, March 19, 1872, and Armstrong to Lowrie, April 15,
1872, documents 102 and 132, file L-l, AIC; Lowrie to Armstrong, June 7, 1872, Board
of Foreign Missions, letterpress copies of letters sent, RG 31-43-2, p. 214, Presbyterian
Historical Society.
14. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1872, p. 308; Armstrong to Pope, April
3, 1872, M-234, roll 559, alA, RG 75. One writer in a Santa Fe newspaper decided that
"a little wholesome chastising will do the Utes good. They have been at peace so long,
and have for that reason been so petted, that they have become spoiled." Santa Fe Daily
New Mexican, April 4, 1872. Alternative spellings used at the time for the Ute chief's
, name included Sobita, Sabato, and Sabita.
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treaty with the United States. Stevenson demanded immediate restoration of. the stolen horses and delivery of the thieves for appropriate
punishment. 15
The Indians laughed at Stevenson's proposition. Sobota promised
to return some of the stolen horses but insisted he could not produce
the thieves because he had no idea who they were. Armstrong and
Stevenson then decided on a devious plan to secure some of the Utes
as hostages pending return of the stolen property and identification
of the thieves. Stevenson urged Sobota and several of his warriors to
accompany him on a friendly visit to Santa Fe to "have a talk with the
Generals." The Indians objected emphatically, stating they could say
no more to the generals than they had already said in the meeting in
Tierra Amarilla. The discussion continued to no avail until late in the
day, when Stevenson decided on a bold stroke. He ordered his seventeen soldiers to surround the Indian delegation, announcing he would
use force, if necessary, to take several Ute hostages. Alarmed, the
Indians'strung their bows and loaded their rifles while one of their
number broke through the cordon of troops to ride for help from others
of Sobota's band assembled nearby.
The situiltion was getting out of hand. Perhaps with sobering
second thoughts about the disastrous potential, Stevenson later
acknowledged reluctance to involve the government in open warfare
with the Ute people. When twenty-five to thirty Ute reinforcements
appeared, the Indians who had been meeting with Stevenson and
Armstrong pushed their way through the soldiers and galloped off to
join them. Stevenson sent an interpreter to plead with the Utes to
return for more discussion, but the emissary soon returned. The Indians had answered, "No! Tell the soldiers to come out here, we want
to fight them."Ib
What to do? Backing away from this challenge might be perceived
as cowardice on the part of the Great Father's soldiers. On the other
hand, a pitched battle might spark a general Ute war. It was a weighty
decision for a young lieutenant. aware that the consequences of his
actions might have far-reachiI?-g effects. Stevenson decided to advance
slowly, careful not to give cause for alarm. As the soldiers approached,
15. J. D. Stevenson, to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, District of New Mexico,
May 6, 1872, and Armstrong to Pope, May 6, 1872, M-234, roll 559, OlA, RG 75; Report
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1872, p. 308; Frank D. Reeve, "The Federal Indian
Policy in New Mexico, 1858-1880," New Mexico Historical Review, 13 (April 1938), 162-63;
Santa Fe Daily New Mexican.. May 17, 1872.
16. Stevenson to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, May 6, 1872, M-234, roll 559,
OIA, RG 75.
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the Indians retreated, wheeling and galloping their horses in a show
of defiance. When they reached the crest of a steep bluff leading down
to a river, however, the Utes withdrew no further. From behind natural
cover, they prepared a determined'resistance. Undoubtedly sensitive
to the futility of his efforts to that point, Stevenson decided to show
his taunting opponents they could not go unpunished. "I could advance
no further after them," Stevenson reported, "unless at great danger of
being entirely cut up unless I dislodged them from the position they
had taken behind the bushes and rocks, so I was obliged to open fire
on them."17
The Utes returned fire, and a sharp, twenty-minute conflict ensued.
Ultimately, the Indians abandoned their positions;' fleeing across the
river, and Stevenson wisely decided not to pursue them into unfamiliar
territory. Casualties were minimal, though the soldiers saw one Indian
fall and one trooper suffered a bullet wound in his leg. In' his report,
Stevenson insisted he and Armstrong had labored for hours to reach
a peaceful understanding, but the Utes' "overbearing pride and self~
reliant foolhardiness prompted them to resist every proposition that
did not suit them."18 Thus ended the battle of Tierra Amarilla.
There were no lasting repercussions, Sobota-and his people were
content to take refuge in secluded areas of the mountains of northern
New Mexico. On May 18, General Gordon Granger, Commander of
the Military District of New Mexico, arrived at Tierra Amarilla with
another contingent of troops. Granger sent messengers to find Sobota
with promises of safe conduct to the' agency at Abiquiu where, if the
Indians returned the stolen livestock, there would be no further action
taken by the government. Also ready for peace, the Utes complied with
Granger's directive, retUrning eleven horses and twenty-four cattle to
Armstrong who promptly returned them to their owners. Armstrong
recalled the Utes saying they would fight the soldiers no more and
intended to maintain harmonious relations with the Great 'Father. 19
Armstrong was pleased with the outcome. He thought he had
acted promptly in calling for military assistance in a potentially dangerous situation. He believed army representatives had appreciated
his advice at all stages of the confrontation, and he was sure a show
of force had had a positive impact on all Indians in his charge. "1 am
well satisfied," he exulted, "that they [the Utes} now fully understand
17. Ibid,
18. Ibid.
19. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1872, p. 308; Armstrong to Pope, May
21, 1872, T-21, roll 15, orA, RG 75.
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that the Government is in. earnest, and that they feel the importance
of :reform among their yqung men. "20
.
Armstrong welcomed renewing friendly relations because another
matter required his attention. His predecessor, Lieut~nant Jonathan
Hanson, had recommended moving the agency from Abiquiu' to Tierra
Amarilla. Hanson believed the agent could maintain closercontactwith
Indians·at Tierra Amarilla and the government would realize savings
from lower rentals on agency buildings. Armstrong agreed with Hanson/s assessment. Pr~senting his case to Nathaniel Pope, Armstrong
also argued that because Tierra Amarilla was located fifty miles north
of Abiquiu, Indians visiting the new agency would no longer need to
pass through more settled areas around Abiquiu. Officials at the Interior
Department were convinced. On June 15 Pope authorized Armstrong
to make the move and by the end of June, Armstrong had completed
the relocation, disposing of the government property at Abiquiu at
public auction. 21
Moving the agency may have yielded· short-term benefits, but fundamental problems remained; The Capote and Weminuche Utes still
showed no desire to move to the Ute reservation in Colorado. Armstrong ventured a compromi~e plan. Let his Utes have a reservation
of their own in the extreme northwest comer of New Mexico. It was
.an area well watered by the San Juan River with good soil an.d an
abundance of timber: Armstrong was aware of Ute aversion to planting,
but th~y would. have to become farmers sooner or later.to survive.·With
their own reservation, many of the young men surely would be willing
to raise crops. In addition, in the protected confines of the reservation
envisioned by Armstr~ng, schools could be established for Ute children/ and missionaries could teach "the true plan of salvation and the
way of eternallife."22 .
Although some government officials in summer 1872 may have
appreciated the need to prepare Ut~ Indians for salvation, a more
urgent matter required attention. Gold had been discovered on the
new Ute reservation in southwestern Colorado. Prospectors streamed
into the area, paying no heed to the restrictions the treaty of 1868
placed on white trespassers. Hoping to persuade ,the Utes to sell the
20. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1872, p. 309; Armstrong to Lowrie,
June 22, 1872, document 197, file L-1, AlC:
21. Armstrong to Pope, Apri130, M-234, roll 559, OIA, RG.75; Armstrong to Pope,
June 25, 1872, T-21, roll 15, ibid.; Pope to Armstrong, June 15, 1872, T-21, roll 29, ibid.
22. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1872, p. 309; Armstrong to Lowrie,
June 15, 1872, document 191, file L-l, AIC.
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mineral-rich portions of the reservation, a distinguished delegation
appointed by the Secretary of the Interior met with representatives of
all Ute bands'except the Weminuche at the Los Pinos agency in southern Colorado at the end of August. Colorado Territorial Governor Edward
M. McCook headed the special commission. For four days' the commissioners cajoled, but the Indians held to a policy of no more land
cessions. Chavez, a leader of the Tabeguache band, summarized the
Ute position succinctly. "1 fear if we sell these mines, other mines will
be discovered in our country," the perceptive chief argued, "and the
miners will want them, and so all will be taken from us. "23
When the meetings concluded on August 31, the participants symbolically'shook hands as a pledge of continued friendship. But there
was no agreement on how to open a portion of the Ute reservation
legally for mineral exploitation. Not invited to the conference, John
Armstrong had no interest in the mining issue, although he was concerned about any arrangements that might affect his two bands of Utes.
He was disappointed to learn the discussions had given no serious
considerations to his plan for a separate Ute reservation in New Mexico.
In fact, the government commissioners had insisted that the "lower
Utes" were still expected to move onto the Colorado reservation. Governor McCook had even told the Indian delegations that it might be
possible for the government to have all the miners removed from the
reservation by December 1. In tum, however, the chiefs would have
to compel the New MeXico Utes to move inside the limits of the Colorado reservation by the same time. The chiefs could provide no guarantee, and the issue, along with the larger problem of reservation
boundaries, remained unresolved at the end of 1872. 24
While his superiors considered the larger Ute problem in early
1873, Armstrong worked toward more limited goals. Citing examples
of destitute Indians visiting Tierra Amarilla during periods of bitter
cold and deep snow, Armstrong reminded Edwin Dudley, newly
appointed Superintendent of Indian Affairs for New Mexico, that he
needed funds to purchase food and clothing for these people. He also
asked for permission to take several Ute chiefs to Washington where
he hoped they could argue for a separate reservation for the Capote
23. Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners, 1872, p. 99. A useful synthesis of
problems associated with opening the Ute reservation to mining can be found in LeRoy
R. Hafen, "The Ute and the San Juan Mining Region," in David A. Horr, ed., Ute Indians
II (New York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 267-324.
24. Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners, 1872, p. 103.
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and Weminuche Utes. Armstrong also hoped to remedy his loneliness
by bringing his wife and children to Tierra Amarilla. 25
These goals remained unachieved because several Presbyterians
in New Mexico again raised questions about Armstrong's moral con"
duct. The first of these accusations reached John Lowrie early in January. The Reverend James Roberts, who arrived in New Mexico in fall
1872 to open a mission school at an Indian Pueblo, warned Lowrie that
he had heard on good authority of Armstrong's having resumed his
bad habits. Outraged, Roberts accused Armstrong of drunkenness and
"whoredom and adultery with his Indians and neighboring Mexicans."26
Lowrie received similar allegations from an elder of the Presbyterian church in Santa Fe. This gentleman said he had encountered
Armstrong three times the past year, and each time Armstrong had
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. On one occasion, Armstrong had attended the Santa Fe church, and members of the congregation were convinced he was intoxicated. The elder even suggested
that in the future, Presbyterian Indian agents in New Mexico should
become members of the' church in Santa Fe so'their conduct could be
monitored by the church's governing body. 27
, Armstrong was not without his defenders. The' agency's interpreter believed Armstrong's story about using liquor and morphine at
times to relieve rheumatic pain. However, he had never known or
heard of the agent sleeping with Indian or Mexican women. In close
association with Armstrong, the interpreter had never seen the agent
so incapacitated he could not attend to his duties, and the Indians had
confidence and respect for him. Another employee at the agency regarded
Armstrong as "a dutiful and faithful officer" who was doing the best
he could for his Ute bands under the circumstances. Certainly, he
25. Armstrong to Edwin Dudley, January 18 and 31, 1873, T-21, roll 18, OrA, RG
75; Armstrong to Lowrie, January 10, March 3, 1873, documents 16 and 65, file M, Arc.
26. Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, October 19, 1872; James Roberts to Lowrie, January
4, 1873, document 10, file M, Arc. James Roberts first appeared in the Southwest early
in 1869 with an assignment from the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian
Church to open a misson station and school at the Navajo agency at Fort Defiance,
Arizona, The board recalled him in 1872 after a dismal record of bickering with agency
employees and failure to maintain an adequate school enrollment. See Norman J. Bender,
"Presbyterians and the Grant Peace Policy: The Arizona and New Mexico Experience,"
in Duane A. Smith, ed., A Taste of the. West: Essays in Honor of Robert G. Athearn (Boulder:
Pruett Publishing Co., 1983), 4, 7-8,
27. W. F. M, Amy to Lowrie, March 17, 1873, document 83, fiJeM, Arc.
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added, no more upright or energetic agent had presided over the agency
in recent years. 28
Such disClaimers of guilt were not sufficient to allay Lowrie's suspicions. Conveying the essence of the charges to Armstrong, Lowrie
expressed hope the troubled agent could give an unqualified denial to
all accusations. Armstrong made no attempt to conceal his indignation,
insisting that all reports against him were false and malicious. He
assured, Lowrie he would go to Santa Fe at once, face his accusers, and
demand they retract their infamous statements. All efforts to clear his
name were in vain, however. His detractors were determined to secure
his dismissal. Satisfied his persecution would continue, Armstrong
resigned effective March 31, 1873, and the Secretary of the Interior
accepted his resignation, convinced, no doubt, that the best interests
of the Indian service were being served. 29
Armstrong left Tierra Amarilla with bitter feelings. Unable to collect
amounts he said the government owed him, he threatened to expose
corruption in the Indian service in New Mexico. He returned to Ohio
and resumed a business career, then reconsidered his resignation and
tried to obtain reinstatement. He insisted he had had no chance to
defend himself adequately against the charges brought against him
and argued that the Utes in his charge were satisfied with his conduct
and regretted his departure. Armstrong's contentions fell on deaf ears
at the Office of Indian Affairs, and Armstrong never resumed a career
as Indian agent in the Southwest. 30.
William Vandever, an inspector from the Office of Indian Affairs,
visited the Tierra Amarilla agency soon after Armstrong's departure.
He noted that Williamson Crothers, the new agent selected by John
Lowrie, was conducting agency affairs efficiently for someone who had
28. M. V. Stevens to Lowrie, March 7, 1873, document 70, file M, AIC; T. D. Burns
to Lowrie, September 16, 1872, document 254, file L-l, Ale.
29. Lowrie to Armstrong, January 29, 1873, letters sent, RG 31-43-2, p. 282, Board
of Foreign Missions; Armstrong to Lowrie, March 3, 1873, documents 63, 64, 66, file M,
Ale; Dudley to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, March 15, 1873, M-234, roll 560, alA,
RG 75; Armstrong to Dudley, March 24, 1873, Office of the Secretary of the Interior,
Appointment Papers, New Mexico, 1850-1907, microcopy M-750, roll 12, RG 48, National
Archives, Washington, D.e.
30. Armstrong to Dudley, May 24, 1873, T-21, roll 18, alA, RG 75; Armstrong to
Clum, July 7, 1873, M-234, roll 560, ibid.; Armstrong to Lowrie, July 16, 1873, document
179, file M, Ale. Still trying to collect amounts due him three years after he left the
Indian Service, Armstrong wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on stationery
that indicated his employment with Allison and Townsley, dealers in dry goods, carpets,
shoes, and hats in Xenia, Ohio. Armstrong to Edward P. Smith, March 31, 1876, M-234,
roll 566, alA, RG 75.
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been on the job for only a short time. It was apparent to Vandever,
however, that the Utes had not advanced much in civilization. They
had cultivated little or no land and seemed indifferent to establishing
schools. Agent Crothers knew the Indians were buying whiskey openly
but seemed powerless to stop it. Removal of the Utes to Colorado could
be achieved, Vandever wrote, if the government remained firm and
insisted the Indians "yield a peaceable submission."3!
Five years passed before the Utes announced their "peaceable submission" to the government/s wishes. In summer 1873/ Colorado and
New Mexico Ute representatives resumed talks concerning land cessions with a delegation of government officials. Yielding to government
inducements, the Ute chiefs signed an agreement surrendering'more
than three million acres in Colorado. Included was a stipulation that
sometime in 1874 the government would establish a separate agency
for New Mexico Utes in the southern portion of what remained of the
Colorado Ute reservation. At last, in the summer of 1878/ the Capote
and Weminuche Utes, unable to obtain any more rations at Tierra
Amarilla, drifted north to the new agency in Colorado where their
descendants reside to this date. 32
In 187i, the Lutheran Church yielded its prerogative to appoint
agents to the Capote and Weminuche Utes because doing so had proved
unpromising. To his sorrow, John Armstrong learned that such an
appraisal was accurate. He was caught in a transition period when
expectations for uplifting the Utes were predicated upon their resettlement in Colorado. Because the Indians refused to comply with this
directive during his tenure, Armstrong could only provide token issues
of food and clothing for his charges. He faced different obstacles and
could do little to civilize and Christianize Indians who were scattered
across a vast area in northern New Mexico. Admittedly, Armstrong
was less than a saintly individual. He found it impossible to adjust to
a situation so culturally different from Xenia, Ohio. It may be that
Armstrong sought relief from 'the pressure of solitude and the frustrations of his job in alcoholic or even sexual outlets. Today, such problems
31. William Vandever to Columbus Delano, August 14, 1873, Reports of Inspection
of the Field Jurisdiction of the Office of Indian Affairs, 1873-1900, miCrocopy M-1070,
roll 29, OIA, RG 75. Williamson Crothers, recruited by Lowrie from Valparaiso, Indiana,
had served previously as agent to the Hopi Indians in northern Arizona. When Crothers
wrote to Lowrie accepting the post at Tierra Amarilla, he announced his resolve to rectify
an unfortunate situation "where the cause of Christianity has been much injured,"
Crothers to Lowrie, February 22, 1873, document 54 1/2, film M, Ale.
32. O'Neil, Southern Utes, 32; Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners, 1873 (Washington, D.e.: Government Printing Office, 1873), 124-55.

256

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

JULY 1988

may not seem unnatural, but the code of conduct governing those
selected as agents under the Grant Peace Policy would not permit
breaches of decorum that hinted of immorality.
Support for the principles of the Grant Peace Policy began to wane
when the president for whom it was named left office early in 1877.
Bold in concept, the program foundered on human frailty. Without a
clear understanding of the conditions of their Indian wards, decision
makers from church and government agencies in the East found it
difficult to understand the problems experienced by Indian agents in
the field. To those so far removed, the answer to the "Indian problem"
seemed simple. The Indians should just settle down, become good
farmers, and feed themselves. With this goal achieved, all other problems surely could be resolved reasonably and inexpensively. While such
reasoning sounded logical when articulated in congressional committees, it was little help to a supposedly good Christian, a young army
lieutenant, and a group of Ute Indians at Tierra Amarilla, New Mexico
on May 6, 1872. To the credit of all involved in the Battle of Tierra
Amarilla, fear of possibly disastrous consequences led to a series of
face-saving alternatives that avoided a major Indian war. With an almost
audible sigh of relief, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis Walker
noted in his annual report for 1872 that the single confrontation between
soldiers and Indians in New Mexico that year had resulted in only a
"slight skirmish. 1133

33. Historians generally agree that support for the Peace Policy declined after Grant's
second term ended. See Fritz, Indian Assimilation, 155; Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, 1872, p. 94.

